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Abstract. Modern web applications heavily rely on JavaScript code ex-
ecuting in the browser. These web scripts are useful for instance for im-
proving the interactivity and responsiveness of web applications, and for
gathering web analytics data. However, the execution of server-provided
code in the browser also brings substantial security and privacy risks.
Web scripts can access a fair amount of sensitive information, and can
leak this information to anyone on the Internet. This tutorial paper dis-
cusses information flow control mechanisms for countering these threats.
We formalize both a static, type-system based and a dynamic, multi-
execution based enforcement mechanism, and show by means of exam-
ples how these mechanisms can enforce the security of information flows
in web scripts.
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1 Introduction
Modern interactive web applications heavily rely on browser-side scripts in lan-
guages such as JavaScript, for instance to propose completions while a user is
typing into a text field. These scripts are usually event-driven programs that can
react to user interface events such as key presses or mouse clicks, or to network
events such as the arrival of HTTP responses. While handling events, scripts can
display output to the user or send output on the network in the form of HTTP
requests.
Listing 1.1 shows a simplified example of such a program that interactively
proposes possible completions for a string that the user is typing into a textfield.
The first three lines declare an event handler for the key up event. That
handler takes the current contents of the textfield with ID field1, and invokes
a helper function that computes the possible completions (for instance by con-
tacting a remote server). These possible completions are finally displayed in the
text area with ID suggestions.
While browser-side scripts are very useful for building responsive interactive
web applications, they also come with substantial security and privacy risks.
Scripts have, and need, access to both user information and to remote HTTP
servers. The completion example above can only perform its function if it can
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Listing 1.1. Suggesting completions
1 window.onkeyup = function(e) {
2 suggestions.value = completions(field1.value);
3 }
4
5 function completions(s) {
6 // return possible completions of s
7 }
read what the user is typing, and if it can contact the remote server to retrieve
possible completions. Unfortunately, a consequence of these capabilities of scripts
is that they are commonly used to leak private information to untrusted network
servers [18, 26]. To illustrate these risks, Listing 1.2 shows an example of a script
that implements a simple key logger in JavaScript. It installs an event handler
to monitor key presses, and leaks every keystroke to hacker.com, using the
jQuery ajax() function that sends an HTTP request to the URL provided as a
parameter. The similarity of this example with the earlier completion example
shows that it is a thin line between useful and dangerous scripts. The fact that
many web sites include scripts from third parties [25] further amplifies the need
for protective countermeasures.
Listing 1.2. Keylogger
1 var u = ’http://hacker.com/?=’;
2 window.onkeypress = function(e) {
3 var leak = e.charCode;
4 $.ajax(u + leak);
5 }
Researchers have realized that mechanisms for information flow security are a
promising countermeasure for web script-related threats, since such mechanisms
allow the scripts to have access to private information but at the same time
prevent it from leaking that information to untrusted servers.
Information flow security can be enforced statically or dynamically. The pur-
pose of this tutorial article is to explain the essence of two techniques for en-
forcing information flow security for event-driven programs: a static technique
based on typing, and a dynamic technique based on secure multi-execution.
The remainder of this tutorial paper is structured as follows. First, in Sec-
tion 2, we define a formal scripting language that is a simple model of JavaScript.
Then, in Section 3, we define information flow control and give both examples
of scripts that are information flow secure and scripts that are insecure. Sec-
tions 4 and 5 define a static, respectively dynamic enforcement mechanism for
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information flow security and illustrate the mechanisms by means of examples.
Section 6 provides a brief overview of the existing research in this area, and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Formal Model of Web Scripts
2.1 Syntax
For the purpose of this tutorial paper, we use a very simple model of a web
scripting language, strongly inspired by the model language introduced by Bo-
hannon et al. [8]. The syntax is specified in Figure 1. We assume certain given
disjoint sets of identifiers: GVars is the set of identifiers for mutable global vari-
ables, Chan is the set of identifiers for communication channel names, and Var
is the set of identifiers for bound variables.
n ∈ Z (Integer number literals)
 ∈ {+,−,=, <} (Primitive operations on numbers)
r ∈ GVars (Global mutable variables)
ch ∈ Chan (I/O Channels)
x ∈ Var (Variables)
p ::= h; p (Reactive Programs)
| ·
h ::= on ch(x) c (Event handlers)
c ::= skip (Commands)
| c; c
| r := e
| if e then c else c
| while e do c
| output e on ch
e ::= n (Expressions)
| r
| x
| e e
Fig. 1. Formal syntax of our web scripting language
A program p is essentially a list of handlers, where each handler h specifies
a command c to be executed on occurrence of an input event on channel ch.
An input event always carries a single integer value, and that integer value is
bound to the formal parameter x before the command c is executed. The syntax
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of commands is standard, with syntactic forms for the empty command (skip),
sequential composition, assignment to global variables, conditional and looping
constructs, and performing output on a channel. Expressions e are standard
integer arithmetic expressions that can refer to formal parameters x declared in
a handler definition, or to global variables r.
In examples we will assume the existence of I/O channels such as KeyPress,
Network , Display , MouseClick , . . . Scripts can output integers on these channels
with the output command. For instance, output 10 on Network will output the
integer 10 on the Network channel. They can react to inputs arriving on these
channels by declaring event handlers. For instance, key presses are modeled
as input events on the KeyPress channel carrying a single integer value that
represents the scan code of the key that was pressed. For simplicity, we assume
that all input events carry a single integer value, and that all output events are
outputs of a single integer value.
As an example, the JavaScript key logger program from Listing 1.2 is ren-
dered in our model language as:
on KeyPress(x) output x on Network
This script declares an event handler that upon each key press sends the key
scan code on the network.
If we want to distinguish different network destinations (for instance com-
munication to the same network origin the web page was loaded from and
other network origins) we can use two separate channel identifiers Network and
SameOriginNetwork . The completions example from Listing 1.1 could then be
rendered as:
on KeyPress(x) output x on SameOriginNetwork
We could even use parameterized channel names such as Network(o) with o
an origin of the form http://www.kuleuven.be for instance.
2.2 Semantics
To define the semantics of the model language, we define stores µ (assigning
a current (integer) value to all global variable names) and outputs o (either
the special “no output” constant · or an output of a number n on channel ch
(outch(n)) (Figure 2). For updating of the store, we use the notation µ[r 7→ n]:
it denotes the store equal to µ except that the global variable r now maps to
the value n.
Using stores, we define a big-step operational semantics judgement for ex-
pressions µ ` e ↓ n (in store µ, expression e evaluates to value n). This definition
is completely standard (Figure 3).
Programs are event-driven. The judgement (p)(i) ⇓ c defines formally what
command c program p will execute to handle the input event i. It is defined
by the rules in Figure 4. Essentially, this looks up the handler for handling the
input event, and substitutes the integer n received on the input channel for the
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µ ∈ Ref → Z (Stores)
o ::= · (Outputs)
| outch(n)
i ::= inch(n) (Input Events)
ev ::= i | o (Reactive Events)
Fig. 2. Semantic structures
µ ` n ↓ n (E-Expr-Lit) µ ` r ↓ µ(r) (E-Expr-Ref)
µ ` e1 ↓ n1 µ ` e2 ↓ n2
µ ` e1 + e2 ↓ n1 + n2 (E-Expr-Plus)
µ ` e1 ↓ n1 µ ` e2 ↓ n2
µ ` e1 − e2 ↓ n1 − n2 (E-Expr-Minus)
µ ` e1 ↓ n1 µ ` e2 ↓ n2 n1 6= n2
µ ` e1 = e2 ↓ 0 (E-Expr-Eq1)
µ ` e1 ↓ n1 µ ` e2 ↓ n2 n1 = n2
µ ` e1 = e2 ↓ 1 (E-Expr-Eq2)
µ ` e1 ↓ n1 µ ` e2 ↓ n2 n1 6< n2
µ ` e1 < e2 ↓ 0 (E-Expr-Lt1)
µ ` e1 ↓ n1 µ ` e2 ↓ n2 n1 < n2
µ ` e1 < e2 ↓ 1 (E-Expr-Lt2)
Fig. 3. Semantics of expressions
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formal parameter x in that handler. If no handler is defined in the program p
for input i on this channel, we have (p)(i) ⇓ skip .
(on ch(x) do c; p)(inch(n)) ⇓ [x 7→ n]c
(p)(inch(n)) ⇓ c ch 6= ch ′
(on ch ′(x) do c′; p)(inch(n)) ⇓ c
(·)(inch(n)) ⇓ skip
Fig. 4. Determining the event handling command
Finally, the semantics of commands is given as a small-step operational se-
mantics judgement (µ, c)
o→ (µ′, c′) (executing command c in store µ produces
an updated store µ′ and new command c′ producing output o). They are defined
by the rules in Figure 5.
The initial program state is (µ0, skip) where µ0 maps all global variables on 0.
A program state is passive if it has the form (µ, skip). We say a program is well-
formed if it has no unbound variables (i.e. the only variable x ∈ Var occurring
in the body of a handler is the formal parameter of the handler – of course, the
handler can also use global variables r ∈ GVars) . It is straightforward to prove
that well-formed programs that are not in a passive state can always make a
deterministic step. The only non-deterministic transitions are transitions that
consume a new input, and these are only possible from a passive state.
An execution of a script is a finite or infinite sequence of events ev:
ev = (µ0, skip)
ev0−−→ (µ1, c1) ev1−−→ (µ2, c2) ev2−−→ . . .
We say an execution is event-complete if it ends in a passive state: this means
that all the input events the program has received have been fully handled, and
that the only way to further extend the execution is by giving it a new input
event.
2.3 Examples
Consider the following script:
on KeyPress(x) total := total + x;
on MouseClick(x) output total on Display
The script keeps a running total of the key scan codes of all key presses it has
seen, and on a MouseClick input event, it displays the total on the Display
channel. This models a simple JavaScript calculator.
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(µ, (skip; c)) ·→ (µ, c)
(E-Stmt-SeqSkip)
(µ, c1)
o→ (µ′, c′1)
(µ, (c1; c2))
o→ (µ′, (c′1; c2))
(E-Stmt-Seq)
µ ` e ↓ n
(µ, (r := e)) ·→ (µ[r 7→ n], skip)
(E-Stmt-Assign)
µ ` e ↓ n n 6= 0
(µ, if e then c1 else c2)
·→ (µ, c1)
(E-Stmt-If1)
µ ` e ↓ n n = 0
(µ, if e then c1 else c2)
·→ (µ, c2)
(E-Stmt-If2)
µ ` e ↓ n n 6= 0
(µ, while e do c) ·→ (µ, (c; while e do c))
(E-Stmt-While1)
µ ` e ↓ n n = 0
(µ, while e do c) ·→ (µ, skip)
(E-Stmt-While2)
µ ` e ↓ n
(µ, output e to ch)
outch(n)−−−−−→ (µ, skip)
(E-Stmt-Out)
(p)(inch(n)) ⇓ c
(µ, skip)
inch(n)−−−−→ (µ, c)
(E-Input)
Fig. 5. Semantics of commands
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The following is an example execution of the script. We denote a memory µ
as the set that has an element r 7→ µ(r) for every global variable r that has a
non-zero value in µ. Hence, µ0 is denoted as the empty set {}.
({}, skip) inKeyPress(10)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, total := total + 10)
·−→ ({total 7→ 10}, skip)
inKeyPress(20)−−−−−−−−→ ({total 7→ 10}, total := total + 20)
·−→ ({total 7→ 30}, skip)
inMouseClick(0)−−−−−−−−→ ({total 7→ 30}, output total on Display)
outDisplay(30)−−−−−−−−→ ({total 7→ 30}, skip)
For the remainder of this paper, we will usually not show the silent actions (·)
in example executions.
As a second example, consider again the key logger script:
on KeyPress(x) output x on Network
The following is an example execution of the script.
({}, skip) inKeyPress(10)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, output 10 on Network)
outNetwork(10)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, skip)
inKeyPress(20)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, output 20 on Network)
outNetwork(20)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, skip)
inMouseClick(0)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, skip)
Key press events get echoed on the network, while a mouse click event is just
silently absorbed (there is no handler for these events).
3 Information flow control
3.1 Introduction
Web scripts can receive and send information on a variety of channels.
They need to receive information from both sensitive and less sensitive chan-
nels. For instance, a script may need to read a password from the user in order
to estimate the strength of the password (clearly a sensitive piece of informa-
tion). Scripts may also need to receive advertisements to be displayed from the
network (an example of a script reading less sensitive information).
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Scripts also need to send information both to trustworthy output channels
as well as to less trustworthy output channels. For instance, in a web based doc-
ument processor, scripts will send document content to the site hosting the doc-
ument processing application (an output to a trustworthy channel). But scripts
may also collect user interaction data to be sent to a web analytics site (outputs
to a less trustworthy channel).
The key idea of information flow control is to allow scripts to perform all
these inputs and outputs, as long as no information received from a sensitive
input channel leaks to a non-trustworthy output channel. Let us assume for the
sake of the following examples that:
– Display is a trustworthy output channel: the outputs on that channel can
only be seen by a trusted observer – the user of the web application.
– Network is a non-trustworthy output channel: the outputs can possibly be
seen by untrusted obervers, for instance attackers.
– KeyPress is a sensitive input channel: we do not want untrusted observers
to know anything about what keys we press.
– MouseClick is a non-sensitive input channel: we do not care that information
leaks about when and where we click the mouse.
To enforce information flow control, these assumptions are formalized in a
policy that assigns a security label to each of the channels. These security labels
should be thought of as confidentiality levels. For the purpose of this paper, we
use only two such levels: H for high confidentiality and L for low confidentiality.
The set of security labels is an ordered set: for our two element set, H > L.
For input channels, the label defines the level of confidentiality of information
received on that channel. Hence, in our examples the label of KeyPress will be H
and the label of MouseClick will be L.
For output channels, the label defines the trustworthiness of the observers
of the output channel. A H observer is trusted and it is OK if that observer
sees information of confidentiality levels H or L. A L observer is untrusted and
should only ever see information of level L.
With these intuitions in mind, we can discuss some examples of secure and
insecure scripts.
Consider again the JavaScript calculator:
on KeyPress(x) total := total + x;
on MouseClick(x) output total on Display
This script is secure: it reads sensitive information from KeyPress but only
discloses it to the trustworthy Display channel.
On the other hand, the key logger script:
on KeyPress(x) output x on Network
is an example of an insecure script. It discloses information read from a H
input channel (KeyPress) to a L output channel (Network). The variant of
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the script that outputs these key presses to a trustworthy network channel
SameOriginNetwork would be secure.
The key logger script above has a blatant leak: it just copies information from
a H channel to a L channel and hence is obviously insecure. But it is important
to note that scripts can also leak information in more subtle ways. Consider for
instance the following script:
on KeyPress(x) r := x;
on MouseClick(x) output r on Network
This script leaks information from KeyPress to Network by first storing the
information in memory, and sending it out at a later moment in time. Hence
this script is also insecure, but in a somewhat less obvious way.
Leaks can be even more indirect. Consider for instance:
on KeyPress(x) if x = 100 then r := 1 else skip;
on MouseClick(x) output r on Network
This script leaks whether the user ever pressed a key with scan code 100: it
outputs 1 on the Network in case it has ever seen a KeyPress(100) event. Hence,
it is also insecure but in an even more indirect way. Flows of information that, as
in the example above, leak information by using the control flow of the program
are often called implicit flows.
The objective of information flow security is to formalize the distinction be-
tween secure and insecure programs that we informally discussed in this section,
and to develop enforcement mechanisms that prevent such insecure information
leaks. We want to prevent both explicit and implicit flows.
3.2 Formal definitions
The notion of information flow security discussed above can be formalized as
noninterference, which roughly says that there should not be two executions of
the program that (1) receive the same L inputs, but (2) produce different L
outputs. The intuition is that if L outputs are always the same given the same
L inputs, then the L outputs could not have been influenced in any way by the
H inputs, and hence do not leak any information about the H inputs.
To make this formal for web scripts, we need a few definitions. We assume as
given a policy that assigns security labels to channels in the form of a function
lbl from Chan to {L,H}.
For a sequence of events ev = ev1 · · · evn, we define
– bevcI the subsequence of all input events.
– bevcO the subsequence of all output events.
– bevcI,L the subsequence of all input events inch(n) such that lbl(ch) = L.
– bevcO,L the subsequence of all output events outch(n) such that lbl(ch) = L.
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Definition 1. A program p is noninterferent iff for any two event-complete ex-
ecutions ev1 and ev2 it holds that:
bev1cI,L = bev2cI,L =⇒ bev1cO,L = bev2cO,L
I.e. any two event-complete executions that receive the same L inputs will pro-
duce the same L outputs.
Example 1. The key logger script:
on KeyPress(x) output x on Network
is insecure according to this definition, because of the following two event-
complete executions.
ev1 = ({}, skip)
inKeyPress(10)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, output 10 on Network) outNetwork(10)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, skip)
ev2 = ({}, skip)
inKeyPress(20)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, output 20 on Network) outNetwork(20)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, skip)
For these two executions, bev1cI,L = bev2cI,L (both executions have no L input
events), but bev1cO,L 6= bev2cO,L (both executions have different L outputs on
Network).
Example 2. Also the script with the more subtle leaks:
on KeyPress(x) if x = 100 then r := 1 else skip;
on MouseClick(x) output r on Network
can be seen to be insecure by considering the following two event-complete exe-
cutions (we do not show the silent output events):
ev1 = ({}, skip)
inKeyPress(10)−−−−−−−−→ ({}, skip)
inMouseClick(10)−−−−−−−−−→ ({}, output 0 on Network)
outNetwork(0)−−−−−−−→ ({}, skip)
ev2 = ({}, skip)
inKeyPress(100)−−−−−−−−→ ({r 7→ 1}, skip)
inMouseClick(10)−−−−−−−−−→ ({}, output 1 on Network)
outNetwork(1)−−−−−−−→ ({}, skip)
It is easy to check that bev1cI,L = bev2cI,L but bev1cO,L 6= bev2cO,L.
3.3 Enforcement
Roughly speaking, there are two classes of approaches to enforce noninterference.
We can statically check that a program is secure, by using techniques such as
type systems or program verification. Or we can dynamically enforce that no
information leaks by using techniques such as monitoring or multi-execution.
In the following two sections, we focus on one static enforcement technique
(based on typing) and on one dynamic technique (based on multi-execution).
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4 Static enforcement
The idea of using static techniques to check noninterference was pioneered in
the seventies by Denning and Denning [14]. There is a huge body of literature
on static enforcement of information flow security. The survey by Sabelfeld and
Myers [30] provides an excellent overview. We illustrate static enforcement by
means of typing by showing a type system that is very similar to a type system
proposed by Bohannon et al. [8].
Types are just security labels (hence, in our case, there are only two types:
H and L). Programmers have to declare a type for every global variable and the
type checker will enforce that the information stored in global variables of type
L will only depend on L information.
We first define a typing judgment for expressions (Figure 6). The intuition
is that the type l of an expression e is an upper bound for the level of the
information that could have influenced e. The judgement (x : lc) ` e : l defines
the type l of expression e in context (x : lc). The context (x : lc) defines the level
of the bound variable x; for an expression that is part of a handler definition on
a channel ch, the variable bound by the handler will get as type the level of the
channel ch.
lc ≤ l
(x : lc) ` x : l (T-Expr-Var) (x : lc) ` n : l (T-Expr-Lit)
lbl(r) ≤ l
(x : lc) ` r : l (T-Expr-Ref)
(x : lc) ` e1 : l1 (x : lc) ` e2 : l2 l1 ≤ l l2 ≤ l
(x : lc) ` e1  e2 : l (T-Expr-Op)
Fig. 6. Typing of expressions
The type system is polymorphic: an expression can have multiple types. Any
type that is an upper bound for the level of the information that could have
influenced e is a valid type. With our restriction to two security levels H and L,
expressions can either have the H type, or both the L and H type. This simple
form of polymorphism in the type system will make some of the typing rules for
commands simpler.
The rule (T-Expr-Var) says that a variable assumed to have level lc in the
context can be given as type any level above or equal to lc, and rule (T-Expr-
Ref) says that global variables can be given as type any level above or equal
to the level assigned to them by the programmer. Literals can have any level
(T-Expr-Lit), and in a binary expression, the level of the result can be any
level that is above or equal to the levels of the two operands (T-Expr-Op).
Next we turn to typing of commands (Figure 7). We define a typing judge-
ment (x : lc) ` c : l, expressing that command c is well-typed with type l in
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context (x : lc). The intuition is that the type of a command is a lower bound
for the level of the side-effects (either assignments to global variables or outputs
on channels) that a command can have. Hence typing is again polymorphic. In
our system, a well-typed command can have both type H and L, meaning it
definitely only performs H side effects, or a well-typed command can have type
L only, if the command possibly performs some L side effect.
(x : lc) `skip: l (T-Cmd-Skip)
(x : lc) ` c1 : l1 (x : lc) ` c2 : l2 l ≤ l1 l ≤ l2
(x : lc) ` (c1; c2) : l (T-Cmd-Seq)
(x : lc) ` e : le le ≤ lbl(ch) l ≤ lbl(ch)
(x : lc) `output e to ch : l (T-Cmd-Out)
(x : lc) ` e : le le ≤ lbl(r) l ≤ lbl(r)
(x : lc) ` (r := e) : l (T-Cmd-Assign)
(x : lc) ` e : le (x : lc) ` c1 : l1 (x : lc) ` c2 : l2
l ≤ l1 l ≤ l2 le ≤ l1 le ≤ l2
(x : lc) `if e then c1 else c2 : l (T-Cmd-If)
(x : lc) ` e : le (x : lc) ` c : l′ l ≤ l′ le ≤ l′
(x : lc) `while e do c : l (T-Cmd-While)
Fig. 7. Typing of commands
Rule (T-Cmd-Skip) says that skip can be given any level. The sequential
composition of two commands must have a level that is below or equal to the lev-
els of the two commands that are composed (T-Cmd-Seq). Rule (T-Cmd-Out)
ensures two things. First, for an output command, the level of the expression
that is output must be below or equal to the level of the channel on which it
is output. Since le is an upper bound for the level the information that could
have influenced e, this ensures no information leaks with this output. Second,
the level l of the command itself must be a lower bound for the effects, and
hence musy be below or equal to the level of the output channel. The rule for
assignments (T-Cmd-Assign) is very similar: assignment to global variables is
an effect that is similar to the effect of producing output. The rules for condi-
tionals (T-Cmd-If) and (T-Cmd-While) make sure that no information leaks
through the control flow and are needed to prevent implicit flows. Parts of the
program that can only be reached dependent on information of level le (like the
branches of an if-statement or the body of a while-statement) should only have
effects that have le as lower bound. In other words, there should be no L effects
in parts of the program whose reachability depends on H information.
Finally, we turn to programs (Figure 8). Each declared handler on ch(x) c
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` · (T-Pgm-Empty)
(x : lbl(ch)) ` c : lbl(ch) ` p
on ch(x) c; p
(T-Pgm)
Fig. 8. Typing of programs
must be type-checked in a context that assigns the label of the channel ch to
the bound variable x, and the side-effects of the resulting commands must be
bounded by that same label; a H input event should not lead to L side effects.
Example 3. Consider again the JavaScript calculator:
on KeyPress(x) total := total + x;
on MouseClick(x) output total on Display
If we define lbl(total) = H, this script passes type checking. The expression
total + x gets type H and the assignment total := total + x can be given both
types H and L (both these are lower bounds for the single effect of assigning to
total). In a similar way, the output command in the second handler can be given
both types H and L.
Example 4. The key logger script:
on KeyPress(x) output x on Network
does not type check. The expression x must be given type H because it arrives
on a H channel (rules (T-Pgm) and (T-Expr-Var)). As a consequence, the
output command fails to type check as the level of Network is L and rule (T-
Cmd-Out) requires that the type of the expression being output is below or
equal to the level of the output channel.
For similar reasons, the script below also does not type check:
on KeyPress(x) r := x;
on MouseClick(x) output r on Network
The first handler can only be type checked of r is given type H by defining
lbl(r) = H. But then the second handler can not be type checked for the same
reason as above.
Example 5. Finally, let us consider an example with conditionals. The program
below:
on KeyPress(x) if x = 100 then r := 1 else skip;
on MouseClick(x) output r on Network
can not be type checked. Since the conditional of the if-statement depends on
H information (x has type H), effects in the then and else branch must be
bounded below by H (rule(T-Cmd-If)) . Hence, the r variable must be made H
by defining lbl(r) = H. But then the second handler can not type check anymore.
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One can prove that any program that type checks is noninterferent.
Theorem 1. Suppose we are given a policy lbl that assigns security levels to
I/O channels, and suppose that lbl can be extended to assign security levels to
global variables such that ` p, then p is noninterferent under that policy.
We refer the reader to [8] for a proof.
Note that the type system is conservative. It is easy to come up with example
programs that are noninterferent but that fail to type check. For instance:
on KeyPress(x) r := x;
on MouseClick(x) output r − r on Network
is noninterferent since the expression r − r always evaluates to 0. But the type
system will treat the expression as H. The fact that type systems (and other
static approaches) reject some good programs is one of the main motivations to
also consider dynamic methods that can be more permissive [31].
5 Dynamic enforcement
The first attempts at dynamically enforcing information flow also date back to
the seventies [16], but for many years static enforcement techniques were con-
sidered more promising. The impression was that dynamic mechanisms are not
a good match for information flow security, as they monitor only a single exe-
cution, and the definition of noninterference talks about two executions. Hence,
for many years the emphasis was on the development of static methods.
In the last decade, we have seen a renewed interest in dynamic methods [31].
The most obvious dynamic approach is monitoring where the enforcement mech-
anism monitors an execution and blocks it as soon as it detects an information
leak. Such a monitor for JavaScript was for instance developed by Hedin and
Sabelfeld [17]. An alternative approach is the approach of secure multi-execution
(SME) [15]. We illustrate dynamic enforcement by means of a secure multi-
execution mechanism that is very close to the mechanism proposed by Bielova
et al. [6].
The core idea of SME for reactive systems is to maintain two executions of
the program (one for each security level, i.e. a low (L) and a high (H) execution),
and to implement the following rules on the I/O performed by these executions.
L input events are handled by both executions, and H input events are only
handled by the H execution. Outputs on L channels are only performed in the
L execution and outputs on H channels only in the H execution.
It is relatively easy to see that executing a program under this SME regime
will guarantee non-interference: the execution that does output at level L only
sees inputs of level L and hence the output could not have been influenced by
inputs of level H.
Similarly, it is relatively easy to see that non-interferent programs run un-
modified: if L outputs indeed only depend on L inputs, then the L execution
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lbl(ch) = H (p)(inch(n)) ⇓ c
((µL, skip), (µH , skip))
inch(n)
====⇒ ((µL, skip), (µH , c))
(New-H-Input)
lbl(ch) = L (p)(inch(n)) ⇓ c
((µL, skip), (µH , skip))
inch(n)
====⇒ ((µL, c), (µH , c))
(New-L-Input)
(µL, cL)
o→ (µ′L, c′L) o = ·∨ lbl(o) = H
((µL, cL), (µH , cH))
·=⇒ ((µ′L, c′L), (µH , cH))
(L-Internal)
(µL, cL)
o→ (µ′L, c′L) lbl(o) = L
((µL, cL), (µH , cH))
o
=⇒ ((µ′L, c′L), (µH , cH))
(L-Output)
(µH , cH)
o−→ (µ′H , c′H) o = ·∨ lbl(o) = L
((µL, skip), (µH , cH))
·=⇒ ((µL, skip), (µ′H , c′H))
(H-Internal)
(µH , cH)
o−→ (µ′H , c′H) lbl(o) = H
((µL, skip), (µH , cH))
o
=⇒ ((µL, skip), (µ′H , c′H))
(H-Output)
Fig. 9. Semantics of SME.
will still perform the same outputs. The H execution gets all events and behaves
exactly as the program would behave without SME so also the H outputs will
remain the same. The only net effect that SME has on noninterferent programs
is that – depending on how both executions are scheduled – outputs may happen
in a different order (but outputs at the same security level remain in the same
order). This is the precision property of SME. Rafnsson et al.[27] have shown
that, if the program is noninterferent and low and high executions are scheduled
correctly, then even ordering of outputs remains the same. However, in many
cases it is sufficient to maintain order only within security levels. For instance,
in the case of web scripts, if graphical outputs to the browser user are H and
outputs to the network are L, it is sufficient to maintain order per security level.
That is, the relative order of graphical outputs in relation to networks outputs
is not important. This observation allows for simple schedulers which, for each
input event, first perform the low execution (if the input event was low), and
then the high execution. In this paper we focus on the case where the scheduler
is simple, and only maintain output order per security level.
We formalize SME for web scripts by defining how to execute a script under
SME. A program state under SME contains two program states of the original
program ((µL, cL), (µH , cH)), the state of the L execution (µL, cL) and the state
of the H execution (µH , cH). We define the judgement ((µL, cL), (µH , cH))
ev⇒
((µ′L, c
′
L), (µ
′
H , c
′
H)) in Figure 9.
The rules (New-H-Input) and (New-L-Input) formalize that H inputs are
only given to the H execution and L inputs are given to both executions. Then
rules (L-Internal) and (L-Output) are applicable until the L execution is
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finished with the current input event. These rules let the L execution run but
suppress any H output events.
When the L execution is done, rules (H-Internal) and (H-Output) kick
in. The H execution can now run, but L outputs will be suppressed.
The initial program state is ((µ0, skip), (µ0, skip)) and a program state is
passive if it has the form ((µ, skip), (µ, skip)). We define the notions of execution
under SME and event-complete execution under SME in the obvious way (similar
to how they were defined for the standard semantics in Section 2.2).
Note that SME does not detect insecure scripts, it automatically fixes them
as they execute.
Example 6. Consider again the key logger script:
on KeyPress(x) output x on Network
If this script is executed under SME, the occurrence of an input event on the
KeyPress channel will be handled by the H execution only (rule New-H-Input).
When that execution performs the output command on the Network channel,
this output will be suppressed (rule H-Internal). SME fixes this example by
never performing any of the insecure outputs.
Example 7. Consider again the script with the more subtle leaks:
on KeyPress(x) if x = 100 then r := 1 else skip;
on MouseClick(x) output r on Network
For this script, inputs on the KeyPress channel are only delivered to the H
execution (rule New-H-Input). Hence the value of the global variable r can
become 1 in µH , but it will always remain 0 in µL. On occurrence of an input on
the MouseClick channel, this input is delivered to both executions (rule New-
L-Input). The L execution runs first and outputs a 0 on Network . Then the H
execution runs, but when it performs the output on Network (that could be 0
or 1 in this execution), this output is suppressed (rule H-Internal).
So we see that SME again fixes this example. The program becomes equiva-
lent to the secure program that always outputs 0 to Network on a mouse click:
on KeyPress(x) if x = 100 then r := 1 else skip;
on MouseClick(x) output 0 on Network
The main security theorem about SME says that any script, when executed
under the SME regime, is non-interferent.
Theorem 2. Any program is noninterferent when executed under the SME se-
mantics.
For a proof, we refer the reader to [6].
Of course, since SME can change the behaviour of programs, we have to
check that it does not change the behaviour of secure programs. We do not want
an enforcement mechanism to do arbitrary changes to the semantics of secure
programs. Fortunately, secure programs are more or less untouched.
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Example 8. Consider again the (secure) JavaScript calculator:
on KeyPress(x) total := total + x;
on MouseClick(x) output total on Display
If we execute this script under SME, the behaviour remains the same. Key presses
are only delivered to the H execution, and the total is correctly computed in µH
(The value of total remains 0 in µL). When an input arrives on the MouseClick
channel, it is delivered to both executions (rule New-L-Input). The output
produced on the Display channel by the L execution is suppressed (rule L-
Internal). The (correct) output produced by the H execution is performed
(rule H-Output). We see that SME leaves the behaviour of this secure program
untouched.
However, with the simple scheduling approach of first running the L execution
and then running the H execution, it might happen that the order of outputs is
changed even for secure programs.
Example 9. Consider the (secure) program:
on MouseClick(x) output x on Display ; output x on Network
If we execute this script under SME, an input that arrives on the MouseClick
channel, is delivered to both executions (rule New-L-Input). The L execution
runs first (rules H-Internal and H-Output can only fire once the L execution
has finished; they state that the L execution must be passive). The output
produced on the Display channel by the L execution is suppressed (rule L-
Internal), and the output on the Network channel is performed. Then the H
execution runs. It performs the output on the Display channel, and the output
on the Network channel is suppressed. The net effect is that the order of the
Display and Network outputs is reversed.
Fortunately, this kind of reordering is the only change that SME does to
secure programs. The precision theorem for SME says that the output, when
projected on an arbitrary security level, remains the same. So the relative order
of outputs on different security levels is the only thing that can change. For an
exact statement of the theorem, and a proof, we refer the reader to [6].
If even this kind of reordering is undesirable, it is possible to schedule the L
and H executions in a more interleaved way so that absolute ordering of outputs
can be maintained for secure programs. We refer the reader to [37] for details.
6 Related work
Information flow security is an established research area, and too broad to survey
here. For many years, it was dominated by research into static enforcement tech-
niques. We point the reader to the well-known survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [30]
for a discussion of general, static approaches to information flow enforcement.
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Several static or hybrid techniques specifically for information flow security in
web scripts or in browsers have been proposed. Bohannon et al. [8, 7] define a
notion of non-interference for reactive systems, and show how a model browser
can be formalized as such a reactive system. Chugh et al. [10] have developed
a novel multi-stage static technique for enforcing information flow security in
JavaScript. Just et al. [19] propose a hybrid combination of dynamic informa-
tion flow tracking and a static analysis to capture implicit flows within full
(excluding exceptions) JavaScript programs, including programs calling eval.
Dynamic techniques have seen renewed interest in the last decade. Le Guer-
nic’s PhD thesis [22] gives an extensive survey up to 2007, but since then, signif-
icant new results have been achieved. Recent works propose run time monitors
for information flow security, often with a particular focus on on the web scripts.
Sabelfeld et al. have proposed monitoring algorithms that can handle DOM-
like structures [29], dynamic code evaluation [2] and timeouts [28]. In a recent
paper, Hedin and Sabelfeld [17] propose dynamic mechanisms for all the core
JavaScript language features. Austin and Flanagan [3] have developed alterna-
tive, sometimes more permissive techniques.
Secure multi-execution (SME) was developed independently by several re-
searchers [21, 36, 15]. Khatiwala et al. [21] proposed a technique called Data
Sandboxing. They partition a program in two programs at source code level and
use system call interposition to implement the SME I/O rules. In followup work,
Capizzi et al. [9] avoid the need for source level partitioning by means of shadow
executions: they run two executions of processes for the H (secret) and L (public)
security level to provide strong confidentiality guarantees. Devriese and Piessens
[15] independently came up with the closely related technique they called SME,
and they were the first to prove the strong soundness and precision guarantees
that SME offers.
These initial results were improved and extended in several ways: Kashyap
et al. [20], generalize the technique of secure multi-execution to a family of
techniques that they call the scheduling approach to non-interference, and they
analyze how the scheduling strategy can impact the security properties offered.
Barthe et al.[5] propose a program transformation that simulates SME. Bielova
et al. [6] propose a variant of secure multi-execution suitable for reactive systems
such as browsers. An implementation of SME in a real browser was done by De
Groef et al. [12, 13]. Austin and Flanagan [4] propose a more efficient implemen-
tation technique called multi-faceted evaluation. In a recent paper, Rafnsson
and Sabelfeld [27] extend SME in several ways by showing (1) how to support
policies that can distinguish presence of messages from content of messages, (2)
how to perform declassification under SME and (3) how to make SME precise
(or transparent in their terminology) even for observers that can observe more
than one level. An alternative, more black-box approach to declassification was
developed by Vanhoef et al. [33].
Information flow security is one promising approach to web script security,
but two other general-purpose approaches have been applied to script security
as well: isolation and taint-tracking.
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Isolation or sandboxing based approaches develop techniques where scripts
can be included in web pages without giving them (full) access to the surround-
ing page and the browser API. Several practical systems have been proposed,
including Webjail [32], ADSafe [11], Caja [24], and JSand [1]. Maffeis et al. [23]
formalize the key mechanisms underlying these techniques and prove they can
be used to create secure sandboxes. They also discuss several other existing pro-
posals, and we point the reader to their paper for a more extensive discussion
of work in this area. Isolation is easier to achieve than non-interference, but it
is also more restrictive: often access needs to be denied to make sure the script
cannot leak the information, but it would be perfectly fine to have the script use
the information locally in the browser.
Taint tracking is an approximation to information flow security, that only
takes explicit flows into account. Several authors have proposed taint track-
ing systems for web security. Two representative examples are Xu et al. [35],
who propose taint-enhanced policy enforcement as a general approach to miti-
gate implementation-level vulnerabilities, and Vogt et al. [34] who propose taint
tracking to defend against cross-site scripting.
7 Conclusions
Information flow control is a widely studied information security mechanism. It
makes sure that programs can not leak sensitive information that they receive for
processing to output channels that might be observable by opponents that should
not learn such sensitive information. Information flow control is an interesting
security mechanism for web scripts, since these scripts need to process sensitive
information as well as need to communicate over untrustworthy output channels.
We have described two information flow control mechanisms for web scripts,
one static mechanism based on typing, and one dynamic mechanism based on
multi-execution. We have explained the intuitions behind these mechanisms and
illustrated them on examples.
Acknowledgments. This research is partially funded by the Research Fund
KU Leuven, by the EU FP7 projects WebSand, Strews and NESSoS, and by
the IWT project SPION. With the financial support from the Prevention of
and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union (B-CCENTRE).
Mathy Vanhoef and Dominique Devriese hold a PhD fellowship of the Research
Foundation - Flanders (FWO). Willem De Groef holds a PhD grant from the
Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology in Flanders (IWT).
References
1. Agten, P., Van Acker, S., Brondsema, Y., Phung, P.H., Desmet, L., Piessens,
F.: JSand: Complete Client-Side Sandboxing of Third-Party JavaScript without
Browser Modifications. In: Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Appli-
cations Conference. pp. 1–10 (2012)
Information Flow Control for Web Scripts 21
2. Askarov, A., Sabelfeld, A.: Tight Enforcement of Information-Release Policies for
Dynamic Languages. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Symposium. pp. 43–59 (2009)
3. Austin, T.H., Flanagan, C.: Permissive Dynamic Information Flow Analysis. In:
Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN Workshop on Programming Languages and
Analysis for Security. pp. 3:1–3:12 (2010)
4. Austin, T.H., Flanagan, C.: Multiple Facets for Dynamic Information Flow. In:
Proc. of the ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages. pp. 165–178 (2012)
5. Barthe, G., Crespo, J.M., Devriese, D., Piessens, F., Rivas, E.: Secure Multi-
Execution through Static Program Transformation. Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Conference on Formal Techniques for Distributed Systems pp. 186–202
(2012)
6. Bielova, N., Devriese, D., Massacci, F., Piessens, F.: Reactive non-interference for
a browser model. In: Proc. of the International Conference on Network and System
Security. pp. 97–104 (2011)
7. Bohannon, A., Pierce, B.C.: Featherweight firefox: Formalizing the core of a web
browser. In: Proceedings of the 2010 USENIX Conference on Web Application
Development. pp. 11–11. WebApps’10, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA
(2010)
8. Bohannon, A., Pierce, B.C., Sjo¨berg, V., Weirich, S., Zdancewic, S.: Reactive Non-
interference. In: Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security. pp. 79–90 (2009)
9. Capizzi, R., Longo, A., Venkatakrishnan, V., Sistla, A.: Preventing Information
Leaks through Shadow Executions. In: Proc. of the Annual Computer Security
Applications Conference. pp. 322–331 (2008)
10. Chugh, R., Meister, J.A., Jhala, R., Lerner, S.: Staged Information Flow for
JavaScript. ACM SIGPLAN Notices 44(6), 50–62 (2009)
11. Crockford, D.: Adsafe. http://www.adsafe.org/ (December 2009)
12. De Groef, W., Devriese, D., Nikiforakis, N., Piessens, F.: FlowFox: a Web Browser
with Flexible and Precise Information Flow Control. In: Proc. of the ACM Con-
ference on Computer and Communications Security. pp. 748–759 (2012)
13. De Groef, W., Devriese, D., Nikiforakis, N., Piessens, F.: Secure multi-execution
of web scripts: Theory and practice. Journal of Computer Security (2014)
14. Denning, D.E., Denning, P.J.: Certification of programs for secure information
flow. Commun. ACM 20(7), 504–513 (Jul 1977)
15. Devriese, D., Piessens, F.: Noninterference Through Secure Multi-Execution. In:
Proc. of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. pp. 109–124 (2010)
16. Fenton, J.S.: Memoryless subsystems. Comput. J. 17(2), 143–147 (1974)
17. Hedin, D., Sabelfeld, A.: Information-Flow Security for a Core of JavaScript. In:
Proc. of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium. pp. 3–18 (2012)
18. Jang, D., Jhala, R., Lerner, S., Shacham, H.: An Empirical Study of Privacy-
Violating Information Flows in JavaScript Web Applications. In: Proc. of the ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security. pp. 270–283 (2010)
19. Just, S., Cleary, A., Shirley, B., Hammer, C.: Information Flow Analysis for
JavaScript. In: Proc. of the ACM SIGPLAN International Workshop on Program-
ming Language and Systems Technologies for Internet Clients. pp. 9–18 (2011)
20. Kashyap, V., Wiedermann, B., Hardekopf, B.: Timing- and Termination-Sensitive
Secure Information Flow: Exploring a New Approach. In: Proc. of the IEEE Con-
ference on Security and Privacy. pp. 413–428 (2011)
22 Willem De Groef, Dominique Devriese, Mathy Vanhoef, and Frank Piessens
21. Khatiwala, T., Swaminathan, R., Venkatakrishnan, V.: Data Sandboxing: A Tech-
nique for Enforcing Confidentiality Policies. In: Proceedings of the Annual Com-
puter Security Applications Conference (ACSAC). pp. 223–234 (2006)
22. Le Guernic, G.: Confidentiality Enforcement Using Dynamic Information Flow
Analyses. Ph.D. thesis, Kansas State University (2007)
23. Maffeis, S., Mitchell, J.C., Taly, A.: Object Capabilities and Isolation of Untrusted
Web Applications. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy. pp. 125–140 (2010)
24. Miller, M.S., Samuel, M., Laurie, B., Awad, I., Stay, M.: Caja: Safe ac-
tive content in sanitized javascript. http://google-caja.googlecode.com/files/
caja-spec-2008-01-15.pdf (January 2008)
25. Nikiforakis, N., Invernizzi, L., Kapravelos, A., Van Acker, S., Joosen, W., Kruegel,
C., Piessens, F., Vigna, G.: You Are What You Include: Large-scale Evaluation of
Remote JavaScript Inclusions. In: Proc. of the ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security. pp. 736–747 (2012)
26. Nikiforakis, N., Kapravelos, A., Joosen, W., Kruegel, C., Piessens, F., Vigna, G.:
Cookieless monster: Exploring the ecosystem of web-based device fingerprinting.
In: Proceedings of the 34th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy. pp. 541–555
(May 2013)
27. Rafnsson, W., Sabelfeld, A.: Secure multi-execution: fine-grained, declassification-
aware, and transparent. In: Proc. of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Symposium (CSF) (2013)
28. Russo, A., Sabelfeld, A.: Securing Timeout Instructions in Web Applications. In:
Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium. pp. 92–106
(2009)
29. Russo, A., Sabelfeld, A., Chudnov, A.: Tracking Information Flow in Dynamic Tree
Structures. In: Proceedings of the European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security. pp. 86–103 (2009)
30. Sabelfeld, A., Myers, A.C.: Language-Based Information-Flow Security. IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas of Communications 21(1), 5–19 (January 2003)
31. Sabelfeld, A., Russo, A.: From dynamic to static and back: Riding the roller coaster
of information-flow control research. In: Ershov Memorial Conference. pp. 352–365
(2009)
32. Van Acker, S., De Ryck, P., Desmet, L., Piessens, F., Joosen, W.: Webjail: Least-
privilege integration of third-party components in web mashups. In: ACSAC
(2011), https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/316291
33. Vanhoef, M., De Groef, W., Devriese, D., Piessens, F., Rezk, T.: Stateful declassifi-
cation policies for event-driven programs. In: Proc. of the IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Symposium (CSF) (2014)
34. Vogt, P., Nentwich, F., Jovanovic, N., Kirda, E., Kru¨gel, C., Vigna, G.: Cross
Site Scripting Prevention with Dynamic Data Tainting and Static Analysis. In:
Proceedings of the Network & Distributed System Security Symposium (2007)
35. Xu, W., Bhatkar, S., Sekar, R.: Taint-Enhanced Policy Enforcement: A Practical
Approach to Defeat a Wide Range of Attacks. In: Proceedings of the USENIX
Security Symposium. pp. 121–136 (2006)
36. Yumerefendi, A.R., Mickle, B., Cox, L.P.: TightLip: Keeping Applications from
Spilling the Beans. In: Proceedings of the USENIX Symposium on Network Sys-
tems Design & Implementation. pp. 159–172 (2007)
37. Zanarini, D., Jaskelioff, M., Russo, A.: Precise enforcement of confidentiality for re-
active systems. In: Proc. of the IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
(CSF) (2013)
